Junius Leisure v. Lancaster County Prison by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-18-2018 
Junius Leisure v. Lancaster County Prison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Junius Leisure v. Lancaster County Prison" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 734. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/734 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
CLD-301        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1589 
___________ 
 
JUNIUS P. LEISURE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON; DIRECTOR OF NURSING;  
PRIMECARE, (Healthcare Provider) et al; NURSE A; NURSE B 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:17-cv-04603) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 30, 2018 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 18, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Junius Leisure appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint 
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons detailed below, we will summarily 
affirm.  
I. 
Leisure, who is proceeding pro se, filed this civil action alleging a federal claim of 
deliberate indifference and a state-law claim of medical negligence.1  According to 
Leisure, he suffers from recurring ear wax build-up, which requires him to clean his ears 
periodically.  Leisure alleged that, while incarcerated at the Lancaster County Prison, two 
nurses (Nurse A and Nurse B) performed the procedure incorrectly.  Leisure claims that 
the nurses skipped the ear wax loosening part of the procedure, and Nurse A (whom he 
believes was performing the procedure for the first time) plunged scalding hot water into 
his ear with a syringe, causing him to vomit and experience pain.  When Nurse B came 
back into the room, Leisure complained that the water was too hot, and Nurse B cleaned 
his ear with cold water.  The nurses gave Leisure ear drops and scheduled him a follow-
up appointment.  Not long after this occurred, Leisure was transferred to a different 
prison.  During a routine examination at the new prison, an audiologist informed Leisure 
that he had some hearing loss.  
                                              
1 Leisure also filed two supplemental pleadings.  Considering the supplements, the 
District Court noted that it appeared that Leisure had abandoned his § 1983 claim and 
sought to proceed only with the medical negligence claim.  Leisure asserts that the 
District Court was wrong because he sought to pursue both.  It does not matter, however, 
because the District Court still evaluated Leisure’s deliberate indifference claim while 
adjudicating the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  
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Attributing his hearing loss to the procedure performed by the nurses, Leisure filed 
this suit against the nurses, the Director of Nursing of the prison, Primecare Medical, 
Inc., and the prison.  At screening, the District Court dismissed the prison as a defendant 
after holding that a prison is not a “person” subject to suit under federal civil rights laws.  
Primecare Medical then filed a motion to dismiss the claims against the remaining 
defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the District Court 
granted, in part.  The District Court concluded that Leisure’s allegations did not state an 
Eighth Amendment claim against Primecare Medical or any of the defendants, and held 
that amendment would be futile.2  The District Court also declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Leisure’s state-law medical negligence claim.  Leisure 
appeals and requests the appointment of counsel. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Rule 12(b)(6).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissals under § 1915); Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. 
v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6)).  
To state a legally sufficient claim for relief, a plaintiff need only plead enough factual 
content, taken as true, to support “the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We may 
                                              
2 The District Court dismissed the federal claim against the nurses and the Director of 
Nursing (who had not been served and who were not parties to Primecare Medical, Inc.’s 
motion) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).   
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summarily affirm the District Court’s ruling if there is no substantial question presented 
on appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
Upon review, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  The 
District Court properly dismissed Leisure’s Eighth Amendment claim.  Through its 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
imposition of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary 
standards of decency.”  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).  To succeed on an 
Eighth Amendment medical care claim, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing 
that ‘the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs’ and (2) an 
objective showing that ‘those needs were serious.’”  Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 
F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 
192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
According to Leisure, before being incarcerated, he cleaned his ears himself by 
purchasing the necessary supplies at a drug store.  Therefore, it is unclear whether his 
recurring ear wax build-up presented a serious medical need.  See Monmouth Cty. Corr. 
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that a 
serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring 
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 
for a doctor’s attention”).  However, even if it did, Leisure has failed to allege that the 
defendants acted with deliberate indifference.  Deliberate indifference can occur when 
prison officials “intentionally deny[] or delay[] access to medical care or interfer[e] with 
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the treatment once prescribed.”  Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “In order to succeed in an 
action claiming inadequate medical treatment, a prisoner must show more than 
negligence.”  Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 104-06).    
Here, if the nurses deviated from professional standards of care, the deviation did 
not amount to deliberate indifference.  See Pearson, 850 F.3d at 541 (concluding that the 
nurse violated the Eighth Amendment because not only did he deviate from professional 
standards of care, but he also had “non-medical motive[s]” for such conduct and 
repeatedly ignored the plaintiff’s treatment requests).  Based on Leisure’s own 
allegations, the nurses promptly evaluated Leisure, performed a procedure to clean his 
ears, and scheduled him a follow-up appointment.  While Leisure argues that the nurses 
incorrectly performed the procedure – which he believes caused him hearing loss – his 
claims amount to, at most, negligence, which is not sufficient to make out an Eighth 
Amendment claim.  See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67; see also Monmouth Cty. Corr. 
Institutional Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346 (“[M]ere allegations of [medical] malpractice do 
not raise issues of constitutional import.”).  In sum, by Leisure’s account, the nurses did 
not act with the “obduracy and wantonness” necessary to sustain an Eighth Amendment 
violation.  See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).3    
                                              
3 Because we find no constitutional violation, it follows that any possible supervisory 
liability claim cannot stand.  See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d 
Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (per 
curiam).  Moreover, Leisure cannot satisfy any plausible claim under Monell v. New 
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As we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the federal claim, we 
perceive no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction on the state-law medical negligence claim.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).  Finally, 
the District Court did not err in ruling that any amendment to Leisure’s complaint would 
have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 
2002).   
IV. 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.4 
                                              
York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  Id. at 694-95 (explaining 
that § 1983 liability requires the action to be based on the “execution of a government’s 
policy or custom” that actually results in a constitutional violation); see also Mulholland 
v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
4 We deny Leisure’s motion for appointment of counsel.  
